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It Could Have Been (MuCH) Worse
R
eaders who are parents or grandparents may know the book “It Could Have Been Worse,” written by the prolific A.H. Benjamin, who tells the story of the 
unexpected and unfortunate things that afflict a little mouse traveling on its way home. The mouse falls into puddles and gets stuck by thorns. Even so, much 
worse things could have happened to the mouse, including what could have turned out to be a fatal run-in with the neighborhood cat. Our mouse, however, 
successfully avoided such calamities, blissfully some of which it did not even know existed.
Hampton Roads in 2013 has traversed a path analogous to Benjamin’s little 
mouse. We encountered some bumps in the road, but have avoided disaster. 
Sequestration (about which we will say more), reduced the value of our regional 
activity by about $460 million this year and cost us approximately 4,000 
jobs. Stagnant federal spending, especially by the Department of Defense 
(DOD), pushed down our annual real rate of regional economic growth to only 
0.94 percent in 2013 (see Graph 1). This is less than half the national rate of 
economic growth and about a third less than the Commonwealth of Virginia 
economic growth rate.
Things weren’t always this way. Table 1 reveals that between 2000 and 2007, 
our region never experienced an annual rate of economic growth below 2.2 
percent and averaged 3.62 percent during that time period. We grew faster, 
economically, than the United States. If there is any balm to be had in this 
comparison, it is that the national economy has been more volatile than that of 
Hampton Roads since 2000; our ups and downs have been gentler.
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED HAMPTON ROADS GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT 










2000 50.35 56.75 4.76
2001 52.64 58.02 2.24
2002 56.03 60.78 4.74
2003 59.99 63.72 4.85
2004 63.69 65.80 3.26
2005 68.27 68.27 3.75
2006 72.70 70.42 3.16
2007 76.46 71.97 2.20
2008 78.04 71.87 -0.14
2009 79.29 72.39 0.71
2010 79.67 71.78 -0.84
2011 82.54 72.81 1.44
2012 85.30 73.93 1.53
2013 87.52 74.62 0.94
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data incorporate U.S. Department of 
Commerce personal income revisions through March 2013.
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GRAPH 1
RATE OF GROWTH OF GDP (U.S.), GSP (VIRGINIA) AND GRP (HAMPTON ROADS)
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data on GDP incorporate latest Bureau of Economic Analysis revisions on July 31, 2013. 
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The Great Recession, 
Defense Spending And 
Sequestration
THIS ECOnOMIC SLOWDOWn HAS BEEn DEEP AnD LOnG
The Great Recession that began in December 2007 (according to the national 
Bureau of Economic Research) has been the deepest and longest economic 
slowdown the U.S. has experienced since the Depression of the 1930s. Graph 
2 illustrates this by focusing on employment and jobs lost. One can see that 
the current economic malaise cost the country more jobs than any other major 
post-World War II recession, but also is lasting longer. At the current rate of U.S. 
job recovery, it will be September 2014 (80 months from the beginning of the 
recession) before we, as a country, will have recovered all of the jobs we lost 
between 2008 and 2010.  
Why has this recession been so deep and the subsequent 
recovery so “job free”? Economists Kenneth Rogoff and 
Carmen Reinhardt have explored these topics in “This Time Is 
Different.” They point out that economic contractions caused 
by crises in a country’s financial system (at the very least, a 
contributing factor in the U.S. recession) destroy consumer and 
investor confidence and threaten the fundamental stability that 
is so critical to hiring and purchasing decisions. Economic actors 
pull in their horns and it takes them a long time to change 
their behavior. Hence, recessions with a strong financial component take 
much longer to iron out than recessions caused by simple cyclical reductions in 
demand.
When thinking about our jobless recovery, it is also important to understand 
that we live in an era in which accelerating technological change often is 
labor saving in nature. Machines and computers are substituted for people. 
Caterpillar, for example, now produces about triple the physical output it did 20 
years ago, but does so with about half the number of workers. Over the long 
run, this is a desirable development. Our collective standard of living increases 
when workers and resources can be saved and shifted to other pursuits. In the 
short run (and this is at least several years in length), however, workers lose their 
jobs and often find it difficult to land new jobs, especially if they are not well 
educated, or are anchored to a given location, perhaps because they own a 
house that is financially underwater.  
In the short run, job recovery also has been retarded by the increasing 
globalization of economic activity. Barbers and hairstylists in Portsmouth or 
newport news don’t have to worry about competition from barbers and 
hairstylists in Shanghai or Jakarta. However, employees at firms such as Stihl 
or Smithfield Foods do have to worry about Shanghai and Jakarta because 
they produce tradable goods whose prices are set in international markets. 
Employees working at such firms must compete head-to-head with workers 
around the world. Literally, these workers must prove their cost-effectiveness on a 
daily basis, or they will see their jobs disappear.
There are encouraging signs that the terms of international 
trade are moving in the favor of the United States. American 
workers continue to become more productive; U.S. firms are 
benefiting from the lower costs of important inputs such as 
natural gas; the cost advantages of competitors such as China 
are being eroded by rapidly rising wages there and increasing 
transportation costs; and the value of the dollar has declined 
over time, making U.S. goods less expensive in the eyes of 
foreign consumers. These developments, however, are gradual 
in nature and competition in tradable goods continues to make 
some U.S. firms reluctant to hire new workers, especially when 
uncertainties exist about the cost of these employees because 
of health care and other factors.
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GRAPH 2
COMPARING THIS RECESSION TO OTHERS: JOB RECOVERY IN THE U.S.
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A Closer Look At Job 
Markets In Hampton Roads
While 2013 will see very modest job growth in Hampton Roads, in 2012 
private-sector employment in our region did grow approximately 10,000 from 
the fourth quarter of 2011 to the fourth quarter of 2012, with professional and 
business services, health care and social assistance, and manufacturing leading 
the way (see Table 2). numerically, our private sector has performed reasonably 
well; our employment problem is governmental in nature – federal, state and 
local governments all have reduced their employment levels over the past few 
years and only began to reverse that trend in 2012.  
Graph 3 illustrates that job recovery in Hampton Roads 
has trailed both Virginia and the U.S. since 2007. Indeed, 
employment in our region still is far below its previous high in 
July 2007. Our region lost approximately 40,000 jobs between 
2008 and 2010 (see Graph 4) and by the end of 2012, we had 
recovered fewer than 10,000. As we soon shall see, faltering defense 
spending is the major culprit here. Rather than our regional economy adding 
more than 5,200 jobs in 2013, we will only add about 1,200 jobs.
 
TABLE 2
THE “HOT SECTORS” FOR JOB GROWTH IN HAMPTON ROADS: 











Private Sector 578,600 588,500 9,900
Health Care & 
Social Assistance
81,530 84,530 3,000




Construction 34,570 36,100 1,530




State Government 22,470 23,170 700
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
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GRAPH 3
RECESSION RECOVERY IN THE U.S., VIRGINIA AND HAMPTON ROADS MEASURED BY TOTAL JOBS RESTORED, 2007-2013
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GRAPH 4
TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT (JOBS) IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1999-2012
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor CES data and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data are not seasonally adjusted. 
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Defense Spending
The “Big Three” sectors in the economy of Hampton Roads are 
defense spending, the Port of Virginia and hotels/tourism. Of 
these three, defense spending easily is the most important and 
in 2013 will account for $21.13 billion in direct spending in our 
region. This is down slightly from the all-time high of $21.97 
billion in 2012 (see Graph 5).  
In the first State of the Region report, produced in 2001, we noted that the 
Hampton Roads economy was heavily dependent on defense spending and we 
needed to diversify our economic base. We’ve said much the same thing every 
year since then and now can report (see Graph 6) that over the past two years, 
we’ve become slightly less dependent on defense spending than we were in the 
past.  
Alas, this is occurring mostly for the wrong reasons.  In 2013, defense spending 
accounted for 44.7 percent of our gross regional product, down from 48.5 
percent in 2011. nevertheless, the major reason for this is that defense 
spending in Hampton Roads actually declined in 2013. It isn’t that our private 
sector has been growing by leaps and bounds (though it has been growing). 
Instead, the decreasing relative importance of defense spending primarily 
reflects fewer DOD dollars being spent in Hampton Roads. We’ve diversified, 
but not under the scenario we’d prefer. 
While our region maintains its reputation as a military town, 
Table 3 demonstrates the reality that military employment has 
declined significantly over the past two decades.  We now have 
approximately 93,000 active-duty military personnel in Hampton Roads (down 
about 35 percent from our high of about 143,000 in 1989) and approximately 
35,600 DOD civilian employees (down about 15 percent from our high of 
about 42,000 in 1990).    
nevertheless, we haven’t felt as much of a negative economic impact from these 
reduced employment numbers as one might expect because the compensation 
of those people who kept their jobs increased significantly. Table 3 shows how 
and why. Between 2001 and 2011, total military compensation 
paid in Hampton Roads rose 67 percent and total federal 
government civilian employee compensation rose 71.2 percent, 
compared to only a 40.6 percent growth in total private 
nonfarm compensation.  
In a nutshell, fewer government employees (military and civilian) have been paid 
much more for their work in recent years. Table 4 reports average compensation 
per active-duty military person during the same time period; one can see it 
rose 97.9 percent, compared to 32.7 percent in the private sector. Average 
compensation here includes all fringe benefits, including housing allowances, 
and reflects the need for the military to attract and retain personnel in the 
absence of a military draft.  
This helps explain why median household income in Hampton Roads 
increased faster than median household income in the United States in the 15 
years between 1998 and 2013 (see Graph 7). The primary engine for this 
development was the significant increase in compensation received by DOD 
personnel in our region. That’s why the share of total compensation received by 
private-sector employees in Hampton Roads actually decreased between 2001 
and 2011 (as Graph 8 confirms). Put simply, DOD employees fared much better 
in terms of compensation than the typical private-sector employee in our region 
over that decade.  
Table 5 provides wage data (if this were compensation, the reported 
percentages in this table would increase by perhaps one-fourth) for specific 
sectors of the Hampton Roads economy between the fourth quarter of 2003 
and the fourth quarter of 2012. Private-sector wage growth in 
Hampton Roads trailed that of DOD employees in every major 
employment classification, and in retail trade was strikingly 
low (only 15.8 percent over nine years). To provide context, consider 
that the CPI-U (Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers) rose 24.6 percent 
during the same period. Thus, the wages of many workers in Hampton Roads 
did not keep up with inflation.
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TABLE 3
GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT AND ToTal COMPENSATION 
(WAGES, SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS) FOR 
MILITARY, FEDERAL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE 
NONFARM SECTORS, HAMPTON ROADS, 





Military Employment -21.3% -15.6%
Military Compensation 13.2% 67.0%
Federal Civilian Government 
Employment -20.6% 15.9%
Federal Civilian Government 
Compensation 13.3% 71.2%
Private nonfarm Employment 21.4% 5.9%
Private nonfarm Compensation 68.0% 40.6%
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting 
Project. *BEA refers to compensation as earnings.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED average COMPENSATION (WAGES, SALARIES 
AND FRINGE BENEFITS) FOR SELECTED CATEGORIES IN 
















Private Sector $32,988 $43,783 32.7%
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting 
Project. *BEA refers to compensation as earnings.
TABLE 5
AVERAGE PRIVATE-SECTOR WEEKLY WAGES IN SELECTED 







Construction $709 $938 $229 (32.3%)
Manufacturing $908 $1,126 $218 (24.0%)
Wholesale Trade $947 $1,208 $261 (27.6%)
Retail Trade $405 $469 $64 (15.8%)
Transportation 
and Warehousing
$790* $1,049 $259 (32.8%)
Information $795* $1,033 $238 (29.9%)
Finance and 
Insurance
$867 $1,190 $323 (37.3%)
Professional and 
Business Services
$1,075 $1,442 $367 (34.1%)
Health Care and 
Social Assistance




$242 $301 $59 (24.4%)
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages in Private Sector and the 
Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Wage data for the Transportation and Warehousing 
and Information industries are second quarter 2005. Data for Health Care and Social Assistance are first 
quarter 2007.
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GRAPH 5
ESTIMATED DIRECT DOD SPENDING IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2013
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GRAPH 7
COMPARISON OF Median HOUSEHOLD INCOME: HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1998-2013
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
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GRAPH 8
SHARES OF SELECTED SECTORS MEASURED BY TOTAL COMPENSATION FOR HAMPTON ROADS, 2001 AND 2011
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *BEA refers to compensation as earnings.
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SEQUESTRATIOn AnD THE FUTURE
If one can dodge an economic bullet, then Hampton Roads almost did so with 
respect to sequestration. As Table 6 reveals, in January 2013 we 
estimated that our gross regional product would grow 1.45 
percent and that we would gain 5,207 jobs – if sequestration 
could be avoided. We now expect reduced federal 
expenditures in Hampton Roads because of sequestration to 
shave 0.51 percent from our growth this year (about $460 
million in current dollars). This will cause our region to grow at 
a paltry 0.94 percent rate and will wipe out most of the jobs 
we had expected to gain this year (3,966 out of 5,207).  
Still, as was true for A.H. Benjamin’s little mouse, it could well have been worse. 
Our original estimate of the impact of sequestration was that it would cost the 
region about 17,000 jobs. However, Congress and the executive branch 
reduced the impact of sequestration on defense spending and granted many 
federal agencies spending flexibility so that they could prioritize their cuts. The 
combination of these two adjustments has been quite beneficial to our region.  
Even so, there are more cuts on the horizon. Graph 9 contrasts three different 
DOD spending regimes. The dark blue line reflects the probable path of the 
base line DOD budget between FY 2009 and FY 
2012 in the absence of any cuts or reductions. 
The red line depicts cuts in base line spending 
already agreed to by Congress and the president. 
These reductions amount to $483.7 billion and are 
spread over approximately nine fiscal years. They 
are already in process. Once can see that we will 
feel their major impact in the first two fiscal years; 
thereafter, base line DOD spending resumes its 
predicted increase.
The green line illustrates cuts in DOD spending 
because sequestration has been invoked as a result 
of the Budget Control Act of 2011. These cuts also 
are front-loaded in the first two fiscal years; they 
amount to another $482.5 billion through fiscal year 2021. Once the DOD has 
adjusted to these cuts in the first two fiscal years, base line DOD spending once 
again will increase at predictable rates.  
“Base line” is an important notion and conceptually is best understood as 
representing the Pentagon’s permanent budget. Thus, the base line budget does 
not include DOD spending for special, “temporary” purposes such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
The bottom line is that defense spending in Hampton Roads 
will take a major hit in FY 2013 ($42.5 billion) and a lesser hit 
in FY 2014 ($12.5 billion). Thereafter, it is likely to resume its 
march upward and thus we may well now be living through 
our darkest economic days. However, the situation is hardly 
static; circumstances change from week to week because of 
new decisions and guidance by Congress and the president. 
It would be unwise to assume that we now have a clear road 
map for our regional economic future.    
In any case, absent international crises that stimulate defense spending, 
2013 and 2014 are unlikely to be remembered fondly in economic terms. 
It is likely that we will experience slow income growth, an inability to reduce 
TABLE 6







Real GRP Growth in 2013 1.45% 0.94% -0.51%
Job Gains/Losses in 2013 + 5,207 (0.70%) 1,241 (0.17%) -3,966
notes: nominal GRP in 2011 is estimated to be $82.36 billion and DOD spending is estimated to be $20.75 billion. 
All of the regional reductions and losses are estimates of the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project based upon the overall percentage cuts in 
national defense spending estimated by the CBO or CSBA.
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unemployment rates, stagnant retail sales and only moderate increases in 
housing prices.  
However, it is not only the absolute level of DOD spending in Hampton Roads 
that should be of concern to us, but also the mix of those expenditures. The need 
of the DOD to curtail expenditures significantly could lead it to consider “big-
ticket” expenditure cuts. 
Here are some of our potential regional vulnerabilities over 
this decade:
•  Congress invokes another BRAC process designed to close or 
downgrade military facilities and programs.
•  The number of aircraft carrier groups is permanently reduced 
by one or two. 
•  One aircraft carrier group is transferred to the Pacific (former 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta did not disclose such a 
move, but did specifically indicate a refocusing of naval 
assets in the Pacific). 
•  Naval construction and repair in the region are delayed or 
reduced.   
•  The number of aircraft at Oceana Naval Air Station is 
reduced.
•  Annual military compensation increases fall significantly as 
salary increases become smaller, and personnel are required 
to pay for larger proportions of their medical expenses.
•  The DOD concludes that major floating assets such as aircraft 
carriers no longer are as useful and defensible as they 
once were, and this leads the DOD to focus its expenditures 
elsewhere.
•  Rapid increases in the prices of significant military assets 
(ships, airplanes, etc.) continue and simply make it 
impossible for the DOD to purchase and maintain as many 
as before. This leads to fewer homeported ships, smaller 
numbers of airplanes located in Hampton Roads and reduced 
construction and repair activity.
•  Rising sea levels in Hampton Roads prompt the U.S. Navy to 
give much stronger consideration to relocating its assets. 
This is a long list and may appear to some to resemble a Chicken Little, “the sky 
is falling” inventory of unlikely circumstances. We should hope this is the case; if 
it is not, then our region is in for bad economic times.
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GRAPH 9
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BASE BUDGETS, FY 2009 TO FY 2021
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REDUCTIOnS In DEFEnSE SPEnDInG TRAnSLATE TO SLOWER 
ECOnOMIC GROWTH AnD FEWER JOBS
Because defense spending is the primary engine for our region’s economy, 
reductions in that spending substantially determine how rapidly or slowly our 
economy grows. We’ve already seen that Hampton Roads lost 
jobs between 2007 and 2012. Most other comparable regions 
of the country lost jobs also, but proportionately not as many 
as we did. Table 7 reveals that between 2003 and 2012, job growth in 
Hampton Roads trailed five comparable metropolitan areas in the Southeast, as 
well as Virginia, north Carolina and the United States.     
Flaccid job growth did not mean unusually high unemployment. For many years, 
unemployment rates in our region have been lower than those in the U.S. This 
has continued to be true in this century. One can see in Graph 10 that our 
average rate of unemployment in 2013 will be about 6 percent, well below 
the U.S. average of 7.6 percent. In addition, not as many people in our region 
filed for unemployment compensation, suggesting an improved labor market (see 
Graph 11).
Nonetheless, how can our regional rate of unemployment 
fall (as it has every year since 2010) when our regional 
job growth has been so miserable? There are two primary 
reasons. First, we have experienced a net out-migration 
of adults from Hampton Roads. The DOD has located personnel 
elsewhere and private-sector job seekers have left the region in search of better 
employment opportunities.  
Second, as has been true nationally, labor force participation 
rates have fallen in Hampton Roads (see Graph 12 for national 
data). This means that many adults have dropped out of the 
labor force and no longer are actively seeking a job. An aging 
population accounts for a small portion of this decline, as does the rising 
proportion of people who are pursuing postsecondary education. Further, there 
has been a significant increase in the number of adults who have claimed 
disabilities that prevent them from working. But, here’s the payoff – if you aren’t 
looking for work, then you can’t be counted as unemployed. The upshot is that 
our low regional rate of unemployment is not quite so shining an achievement as 
it first seems. For a variety of reasons – not always good – some people simply 
have stopped looking for work.    
TABLE 7
COMPARING CIVILIAN JOB GAINS AND LOSSES IN HAMPTON 





























north Carolina 354.4 -153.2
201.2 
(5.31%)
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor CES seasonally unadjusted data and the Old Dominion University Economic 
Forecasting Project. *Peak employment in Charlotte, Durham, Raleigh and Virginia occurred in 2008. Changes 
for these areas are shown for 2003 through 2008 and 2008 through 2012.
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GRAPH 10
HAMPTON ROADS AND U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, 2000-2013
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data are not seasonally adjusted. 
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GRAPH 11
MONTHLY INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS FOR HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2004 THROUGH MAY 2013 
(12-MONTH MOVING AVERAGE)
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Old Dominion University Forecasting Project 
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GRAPH 12
FALLING CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE, U.S. ADULTS, 1973-2013
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The Port Of Virginia
2012 was a year of change and dramatic uncertainty for the Port of Virginia. 
Falling market shares and tonnage between 2008 and 2011 (see Graph 13) 
were among the reasons cited by Gov. Bob McDonnell when he sacked all 
but one member of the board of the Virginia Port Authority. APM Maersk then 
submitted what was termed an unsolicited bid to take over the management of 
the Port; this soon resulted in two other credible competitive proposals along 
with the possibility that the existing management arrangement with Virginia 
International Terminals would continue. Most of the senior leadership of the Port 
of Virginia exited.  
Many people and businesses connected to the Port made it known that they 
were opposed to privatizing its management, citing, inter alia, a fear that 
a private manager would not serve them as well and might whipsaw them 
against other ports with respect to rates and services. Several legislators filed 
proposed legislation that would have slowed or prevented Virginia’s secretary of 
transportation (who was tasked by the governor with the responsibility to assess 
the privatization proposals and make a recommendation) from moving ahead 
on privatization.  
The three privatization applicants (though one dropped out along the way) 
pointed out that nearly all of the major ports in the United States have some 
or all of their operations managed by private operators. They pledged 
transparency, guarantees against whipsawing and increased cargo activity. 
Further, they promised the Commonwealth payments that variously were 
evaluated as having current values in the range of $3 billion to $4 billion 
spread over 50 to 60 years. This was more than enough to get the attention of 
those seeking funds that might deal with transportation and toll-related issues in 
the region.  
The newly appointed membership of the board of the Port Authority ultimately 
decided not to accept any of the privatization proposals, but simultaneously 
moved to reorganize the structure and operation of the Port of Virginia to 
eliminate duplication, save money and increase market share. 
In any case, activity at the Port rebounded magnificently in 
2012 and continued to increase in 2013, though at more modest 
rates. Twenty-foot equivalent container units (TEUs) increased 
by 9.8 percent in 2012 and we forecast they will increase 5.1 
percent in 2013 (see Graph 14). Further, as Graph 15 discloses, 
after several years of losing market share along the East Coast, 
the Port of Virginia reversed this trend in 2012 and 2013, but not 
yet sufficiently to restore its share to its recent peak level in 2007.
An additional positive development is the increased use of rail connections to 
take cargo from the Port to customers. As a rule of thumb, cargo that is destined 
for customers located within 200 to 250 miles of an East Coast port is delivered 
by truck. Such “close in” cargo often is referred to as “captive” because it is 
unlikely any competitor port can take it away because hauling costs are highly 
sensitive to increasing distance. Beyond the 200- to 250-mile radius from 
the port, however, cargo is “discretionary” and a variety of ports potentially 
compete for that traffic. To the south, Savannah and Charleston are major 
competitors; to the north and midwest, Baltimore and new York/new Jersey 
(particularly the latter) provide the major competition, and customers located in 
sites such as Chicago potentially can take bids from four or five different ports.
Hence, it is very good news that the share of containers 
moving in and out of the Port of Virginia via rail connections 
has been increasing and now accounts for almost one-third of 
all of the containers exiting Hampton Roads (see Graph 16). 
This means that the Port of Virginia is winning competitive 
battles over which ports along the East Coast will handle 
discretionary cargo. 
Realistically, the recent success of the Port of Virginia reflects the conjunction 
of many different factors, among them the completion of norfolk Southern’s 
Heartland Rail Corridor to the Midwest, which permits the double stacking 
of TEUs; a new streamlined service to Greensboro, n.C.; CSX’s on-dock rail 
services at the APM Terminal in Portsmouth; the Port’s ability to handle deep-draft 
ships; more first-in, first-out service for ships coming and going; local efficiencies; 
and improved management. The payoff to Hampton Roads will be 
more jobs and higher incomes.
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GRAPH 13
GENERAL CARGO TONNAGE AT THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS, 1991-2013




















General cargo tonnage increased by 12.2% in 2012 
and we furei;as.t c 4 2% inaease in 2013. 
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GRAPH 14
TWENTY-FOOT EQUIVALENT CONTAINER UNITS (TEUs) IN THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS, 1991 TO 2013
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GRAPH 15
SHARES OF TOTAL LOADED TEU CONTAINERS FOR SELECTED PORTS ON THE EAST COAST, 2006-2013*
Sources: American Association of Port Authorities and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Market shares exclude TEUs for Philadelphia, Miami, Palm Beach and Port Everglades. 
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GRAPH 16
MOVEMENT OF CONTAINERS AT THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS BY TYPE OF TRANSPORTATION, 2011-2013
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Tourism And Hotels
The recession hit the region’s tourism industry so hard and 
collectively that the industry has yet to recover. Graph 17 
reveals that hotel revenue in Hampton Roads still is well below 
its 2007 record high. The coin of the realm, however, in measuring the 
efficiency and success of hotels and motels is REVPAR, revenue received per 
available room. One can see in Table 8 that REVPAR in Hampton Roads for 
2012 still was 9.96 percent below the 2007 level, with only Virginia Beach 
counteracting the negative trend within the region.    
If Virginia Beach (the region’s largest tourist destination) is enjoying increased 
REVPAR, this implies that the other cities are experiencing declining REVPAR. 
In the case of newport news/Hampton, REVPAR was down 13.59 percent 
between 2007 and 2012, while norfolk/Portsmouth’s REVPAR was down 
10.97 percent. The big losers, however, were Chesapeake/Suffolk (-18.79 
percent) and Williamsburg (-22.18 percent). Graph 18 discloses that 
Williamsburg’s share of regional hotel revenues fell dramatically from 30.6 
percent in 1999 to only 17.8 percent in 2012.  
While REVPAR in both Chesapeake/Suffolk and Williamsburg has been 
suffering, their situations are different. One can see in Graph 19 
that Chesapeake/Suffolk’s problem is that it overbuilt hotel 
capacity, especially between 2008 and 2010. More people were 
staying in Chesapeake/Suffolk’s hotels during this time (primarily business 
travelers), but not nearly enough to soak up the huge increases in rooms 
available. Thus, REVPAR fell. This situation is remediable, however. The number 
of available rooms held almost constant between 2011 and 2012, and 
continued increases in the use of these rooms gradually will eliminate the excess 
capacity.  
Williamsburg (effectively, the Historic Triangle, which 
includes Jamestown and Yorktown) confronts very different 
circumstances. Room capacity has not increased in recent years 
and actually is about 8 percent less than it was in 2000. It is 
apparent from Graph 20 that Historic Triangle room rentals 
have declined substantially since 2000 (though they have been 
roughly constant since 2009). The Historic Triangle appears to 
face a long-term challenge attracting tourists, especially younger 
tourists who, as the 1960s pop song opines, perhaps “don’t know much about 
history” – or care much – and may have short, smartphone-induced attention 
spans. It may be easier for Virginia Beach to attract repeat visitors to its 
oceanfront amenities than for the Historic Triangle to convince tourists to return 
there. It will suffice to say that the Historic Triangle has its work cut out in terms of 
marketing its wonderful attractions in a fashion that will attract additional visitors. 
It is a cultural and historical gem, as well as a major employer, and it is in the 
best interests of Hampton Roads that it achieve financial success.
TABLE 8




Virginia $61.95 $57.12 -7.80%
U.S. $65.52 $65.17 -0.60%
Hampton Roads $52.90 $47.63 -9.96%
Myrtle Beach $53.92 $51.44 -4.91%
Ocean City $71.12 $68.80 - 3.91%
Coastal Carolina $55.84 $54.09 -1.32%
Virginia Beach $64.75 $66.10 +2.12%




Chesapeake/Suffolk $52.90 $42.96 -18.79%
Williamsburg $47.48 $36.95 -22.18%
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Reports, Jan. 18, 2013, and the Old Dominion University Economic 
Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 17
HOTEL REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1996-2013
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GRAPH 18
ESTIMATED CITY HOTEL MARKET SHARES IN HAMPTON ROADS AS INDICATED BY INDUSTRY REVENUES, 1999 AND 2012
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Reports Dec. 27, 2007, Dec. 23, 2009, and, Jan. 18, 2013, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
1999 2012 
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GRAPH 19
HOTEL ROOM NIGHTS IN CHESAPEAKE/SUFFOLK MARKET, 1999-2012
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GRAPH 20
HOTEL ROOM NIGHTS IN THE HISTORIC TRIANGLE (WILLIAMSBURG) MARKET, 1999-2012
Sources: Smith Travel Research, Dec. 27, 2007, Jan. 18, 2013, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Williamsburg market includes city of Williamsburg, James City County, York County and Gloucester County.
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Summing It Up
Yes, 2013 was not a great year, but it really could have been worse. We 
were able to vault over federal budget sequestration and achieve modestly 
respectable private-sector economic growth. Bright spots included the Port of 
Virginia and tourism in Virginia Beach. And, as we will see in the next chapter, 
the regional housing market has turned the corner and despite still hefty levels of  
distressed, bank-owned homes and homes being auctioned, is healthier than it 
has been for half a decade.  

